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CV-MDI-QKD with coherent state: One-mode Gaussian attacks are not enough
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The security proof of continuous variable (CV) measurement device independent (MDI) quantum
key distribution (QKD) cannot be reduced to the analysis of one-mode Gaussian attacks (in partic-
ular, independent entangling-cloner attacks). To stress this point, the present work provides a very
simple (almost trivial) argument, showing that there are an infinite number of two-mode Gaussian
attacks which cannot be reduced to or simulated by one-mode Gaussian attacks. This result fur-
ther confirms that the security analysis of CV-MDI-QKD must involve a careful minimization over
two-mode attacks as originally performed in [S. Pirandola et al., Nature Photon. 9, 397-402 (2015)].
I. INTRODUCTION
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution MDI-QKD [1, 2] promises to be a remarkably ef-
fective solution for the practical implementation of the
next generation of QKD infrastructures, in which pri-
vacy should be granted over a quantum network. In
MDI-QKD the authorized users of the network, Alice and
Bob, exploit a swapping-like protocol where secret cor-
relations are established by the measurement of a third
untrusted party, the relay [1, 3, 4]. This performs a Bell
measurement but, in order to achieve security, it is not
required to pass a Bell test. By contrast, in full device
independent QKD [5, 6], the privacy of the shared key
depends on passing a Bell test, which is still an operation
performed with very poor success rates [7–9]. The power
of the MDI approach relies indeed on its practicality:
One can achieve high-rate side-channel-free uncondition-
ally secure network communication.
In recent years the study of QKD protocols based on
quantum continuous variables (CVs) [10] has attracted
increasingly attention because of several appealing prop-
erties of CV systems: Protocols use bright coherent
states, and exploit standard telecommunication technolo-
gies; in particular coherent detection techniques, already
developed for classical optical communication [11]. In
addition, CV-QKD is interesting for the relatively sim-
ple implementation of protocols at different frequencies
[12, 13]. Finally, exploiting CV point-to-point proto-
col with state-of-the-art classical reconciliation and error
correction schemes [14, 15] allowed the in field implemen-
tation CV-QKD over a distance of 80 Km [16].
In recent works [3, 4, 17] we proposed a CV-MDI-
QKD protocol, which we have also successfully tested
in a proof-of-principle experiment [3]. In particular, we
proved that our scheme is capable of remarkably high
key-rates per use of the communication channel, over
the length of metropolitan range distances. This per-
formance is orders of magnitude higher than comparably
practical implementations based on discrete variable [18].
We therefore believe that CV-QKD will play a crucial
role in future implementation of metropolitan quantum
cryptography. At this scale, in fact, both high density
of untrusted nodes and high rates should be considered
nonnegotiable properties, if we want a quantum network
able of competing with present classical infrastructure.
In this work we provide additional evidences sup-
porting the security analysis of CV-MDI-QKD given
in Refs. [3, 4]. We show, by simple arguments, that
the security analysis restricted to one-mode Gaussian
(entangling-cloner) attacks can only account for a sub-
class of all possible eavesdroppings. In particular we pro-
vide a counterexample in order to explicitly prove that,
if we model Eve’s attack assuming a restricted strategy,
based on independent entangling cloners, one cannot gen-
erate all the possible covariance matrices shared between
Alice and Bob. Our analysis confirms that a complete se-
curity analysis of CV-MDI-QKD cannot indeed avoid to
consider two-mode Gaussian attacks, as originally done
in Refs. [3, 4].
The structure of the paper is the following. In Sec-
tion II we present the protocol. Section III gives general
consideration about the security analysis, marking the
difference between theoretical and experimental analy-
ses. Section IV provides a simple counter example to the
(wrong) assumption that an attack by independent en-
tangling cloners would be complete. Finally, Sec. V is for
our conclusions.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
We start with a brief description of the protocol [3]. At
one side, Alice prepares a mode A in a coherent state |α〉
whose amplitude α is modulated by a Gaussian distri-
bution with zero mean and large variance. At the other
side, Bob prepares his mode B in another coherent state
|β〉 whose amplitude β is modulated by the same Gaus-
sian distribution as Alice. Modes A and B are then sent
to an intermediate relay where a CV Bell detection is
performed. The classical outcomes are combined in a
complex variable γ, which is communicated to Alice and
Bob via a public channel. As a result, knowledge of γ en-
ables each party to infer the variable of the other party
by simple postprocessing (see Fig. 1).
In general, the relay is assumed to be untrusted [1],
i.e., operated by Eve, and also the links with the relay
are subject to eavesdropping. The protocol is assumed
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FIG. 1: Basic protocol of CV-MDI-QKD
to be performed many times, so that the honest par-
ties collect a large amount of classical data (we consider
asymptotic security here). Using several tools, includ-
ing de Finetti arguments and the extremality of Gaus-
sian states (see Ref. [3] for more details), one can reduce
the security analysis to considering a two-mode Gaus-
sian attack against the two links with the relay (per-
forming a proper CV Bell detection). This type of attack
can be constructed by suitably combining two canonical
forms [19] into a correlated-noise Gaussian environment.
The most relevant canonical forms are clearly the lossy
channels.
In this scenario, the two modes A and B are mixed
with two ancillary modes, E1 and E2, by two beam split-
ters with transmissivities τA and τB , respectively. These
ancillary modes belong to a reservoir of ancillas (E1, E2
plus an extra set e) in a pure Gaussian state. The re-
duced state σE1E2 is a correlated thermal state with zero
mean and covariance matrix (CM) in the normal form
σE1E2 =
(
ωAI G
G ωBI
)
, G :=
(
g 0
0 g′
)
, (1)
where ωA, ωB ≥ 1 are the variances of the thermal noise
affecting each link, while g and g′ are correlation pa-
rameters, satisfying suitable physical constraints [20, 21].
After interaction, Eve’s ancillas are stored in a quantum
memory, measured at the end of the protocol (see Fig. 2).
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FIG. 2: Two-mode Gaussian attack against CV-MDI-QKD.
Figure adapted from Ref. [3].
In order to deal with the joint attack, Alice and Bob
must retrieve the joint statistics of the variables α, β, and
γ. For this purpose, they publicly compare a small part
of their data and reconstruct the probability distribution
p(α, β, γ). The empirical values of the transmissivities
τA and τB are accessible to the parties from the first-
order moments of p(α, β, γ). Knowing these values is
essential in order to apply the correct post-processing
and re-scaling of the output data. Then, from the second-
order moments of p(α, β, γ), Alice and Bob can extract
the CM Vab|γ that they would share in an equivalent
entanglement-based representation of the protocol [22]
and conditioned to the outcome γ of the Bell detection at
the relay (see Ref. [3] for more details). From this shared
post-relay CM, they can derive the secret-key rate of the
protocol.
III. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is important to note that, once the shared CM Vab|γ
is reconstructed by Alice and Bob, the secret-key rate
can be (numerically) computed no matter what the ac-
tual eavesdropping strategy was. In fact, it is sufficient
to consider the purification of the state ρab|γ into an envi-
ronment which is assumed to be fully controlled by Eve.
This is a pretty standard method in CV-QKD.
However, while this approach is valid for experimental
demonstrations, it is generally not sufficient for deriving
analytic expressions of the key rate R, just because there
are too many free parameters in the CM. Having simple
analytic expressions is crucial in order to theoretically
compare the performances of different QKD protocols.
The next theoretical step is therefore the reduction of
the free parameters to a minimum set which is accessible
to the parties and that allows us to write a closed formula
for R (or a lower-bound to R).
It is typical to derive a single quantifier of the noise,
the so-called ‘excess noise’ ε, to be associated to the ob-
served values of the transmissivities τA and τB . Such a re-
duction is the non-trivial part of the theoretical analysis
since it requires a minimization of the rate with respect
to all degrees of freedom of Eve, once that the triplet τA,
τB, and ε has been fixed. One important pre-requisite
for such a reduction is the correct modelling of the most
general attack that Eve can perform against the proto-
col. The entire “space of the attacks” must be covered in
this analysis. As pointed out in Ref. [3], CV-MDI-QKD
requires the explicit consideration of all two-mode Gaus-
sian attacks, not just one-mode Gaussian attacks, where
g = g′ = 0. The latter class is in fact restricted and can
only lead to partial security proofs.
IV. SIMPLE COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO
ONE-MODE ATTACKS
Here we easily show that one-mode Gaussian attacks
represent a restricted class and, therefore, any security
proof of CV-MDI-QKD based on these attacks can only
be partial. Furthermore, since they form a restricted
class, it does not make sense to claim their optimality.
For the sake of simplicity, consider the symmetric con-
figuration [4], where Alice’s and Bob’s channels are iden-
tical lossy channels, with the same transmissivity τ . Ex-
3tension to asymmetric configurations is just a matter of
technicalities. After the action of the relay, the shared
CM of Alice and Bob is simply given by [3]
Vab|γ =
(
µI 0
0 µI
)
− (µ2 − 1)τ


1
θ
0 − 1
θ
0
0 1
θ′
0 1
θ′
− 1
θ
0 1
θ
0
0 1
θ′
0 1
θ′

 ,
(2)
where
θ := 2 [τµ + (1− τ)x] , θ′ := 2 [τµ+ (1 − τ)x′] . (3)
with
x =
ωA + ωB
2
− g, x′ =
ωA + ωB
2
+ g′. (4)
In the previous CM, the modulation parameter µ is
known to Alice and Bob, and also the transmissivity τ
which is derived by comparing the shared data and com-
puting the first-order moments. By contrast, Alice and
Bob do not directly access the values of the thermal noise
and the correlation parameters, since they are combined
in the x-parameters of Eq. (4). The fact that the pa-
rameters ωA, ωB, g and g
′ get scrambled in x and x′ has
led some authors [23] to claim that one-mode attacks
(g = g′ = 0) with suitable values of the thermal noise
(ωA and ωB) could simulate any two-mode attack with
arbitrary ωA, ωB, g, and g
′. However, it is quite trivial
to check that this is not the case.
To understand this point, it is important to note that
the components of the CM Vab|γ are monotonic in x and
x′. As an example, the top-left component
V11 = µ−
(µ2 − 1)τ
2 [τµ+ (1 − τ)x]
(5)
is increasing in x, so that V11 is minimum when x is
minimum. In the case of one-mode attacks (g = g′ = 0),
we have x ≥ 1. It is therefore clear that any two-mode
attack such that x < 1 cannot be simulated by one-mode
attacks. Indeed there is an infinite number of such two-
mode attacks. In fact, let us assume that Eve performs
a two-mode attack with ωA = ωB = ω and g
′ = −g. In
this case, we have x = x′ = ω − g, and the condition
x < 1 corresponds to imposing
ω − 1 < g ≤
√
ω2 − 1, (6)
which are attacks where Eve’s ancillas are entangled.
Thus, for any value of ω, we can pick an entangled
two-mode attack which cannot be simulated by one-mode
attacks. In other words, this entangled attack generates
a shared CM Vab|γ which does not belong to the set
of possible CMs associated with one-mode attacks. As
depicted in Fig. 3, there is an infinite number of entangled
attacks which cannot be reduced to one-mode attacks.
One may attempt to enlarge the set of one-mode at-
tacks by allowing for squeezed thermal noise, i.e., the use
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FIG. 3: Correlation parameter g versus thermal noise ω. For
any value of ω, two-mode attacks with 0 ≤ g ≤ ω − 1 are
performed with separable ancillas, while two-mode attacks
satisfying the stronger condition of Eq. (6) have entangled
ancillas and cannot be simulated by one-mode attacks. Values
of g above
√
ω2 − 1 are prohibited by quantum mechanics.
of thermal states with asymmetric variances, ωqA for the
q-quadrature and ωpA for the p-quadrature (and similarly,
ω
q
B and ω
p
B, for the other ancilla). In this case, Eq. (4)
for one-mode attacks would become
x =
ω
q
A + ω
q
B
2
, x′ =
ω
p
A + ω
p
B
2
. (7)
However, since ωqAω
p
A ≥ 1 and ω
q
Bω
p
B ≥ 1, it is easy to
check that realizing x < 1 would imply x′ > 1, and vice
versa. As a result, there will always be components in
the shared CMVab|γ whose values, for entangled attacks,
cannot be realized by assuming one-mode attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
We have considered the security analysis of CV-MDI-
QKD. We have explicitly shown that one-mode Gaussian
(entangling-cloner) attacks represent a restricted class,
which cannot generate all the possible shared CMs for
Alice and Bob. This is true for any fixed value of the
transmissivity τ for the two lossy channels (extension to
different transmissivities τA and τB is trivial). This very
simple result confirms the necessity of explicitly studying
two-mode Gaussian attacks in the security analysis of
CV-MDI-QKD, as originally considered in Ref. [3].
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